# 1NC Round 3 Wake

## Off-Case

### T

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution---they don’t:

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches in DC

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### ‘Prohibitions’ are laws.

Collins ’12 [Collins English Dictionary; carbon dated April 23, 2012; “prohibition,” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/prohibition]

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

That’s key to ensure negative contestability---alternative frameworks crush limits by deviating from the resolutional agent and mechanism, make affirmative content unpredictable, AND selectively erase negative ground by reclarifying their advocacy.

#### There’s 2 impacts---

#### 1) Procedural Fairness---Predictability of the resolution ensures an equal chance to win 50% of debates on the negative---non-resolutional aff choice overstretches the research burden which puts them structurally ahead. It also decreases the viability of pre-tournament prep which unbalances the game. That’s an impact since debate is inherently a competitive space and the ability to win each individual debate matters---especially true considering the ballot can only resolve our procedural impacts

#### 2) Iteration---resolutional stasis is key to refute the aff rigorously---their interpretation encourages AFF conditionality and shielding links since their advocacy isn’t tied to a predictable stasis---that encourages teams to craft the trickiest 1AC which prevents testing over essential truth-claims and solvency---instead prefer debates against well-prepared opponents that make us better advocates---that fosters the best disagreement and ensures we have the ability to persuade people who hold dissenting opinions

Default to competing interpretations---winning the 1AC was good doesn’t prove their counterinterpretation is. Neg framework ballots pick a winner but no ballot solves structural impacts. Any “net benefit” to their interp that isn’t about the types of debates it encourages is not offense---you can vote neg and agree with claims like “the 1AC was good” or “some topical debates could be bad”.

### Politics K

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power---that makes a litany of crisis likely---legal change is key

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### The alternative endorses grassroots organizing---It endorses the 1AC, but rejects its rejection of the liberatory potential of legal antitrust reform.

Zephyr Teachout 20, associate professor of law at Fordham University, 2014 political candidate for governor of New York receiving 34% of the primary vote, *Break ‘Em Up: Recovering Our Freedom from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money,* 2020, e-book not paginated.

For decades, instead, the left has failed to understand the magnitude of the concentration problem, how it limits freedom in so many areas of life, how it drives inequality and empowers racism. We have focused on petitioning public government to redistribute wealth or provide social services, ignoring the creation of new, private systems of government that run our day-to-day lives. When progressives do fight private power, therefore, we often do so on the terms set by the right, in which one’s role as a consumer is more centrally important than one’s role as a citizen. Our main tool has been naming and shaming with the goal of persuading corporate boardrooms to change behavior, not persuading Congress to act. You’ve heard the phrases: Vote with your feet. Vote with your wallet. You may even have internalized them so completely that you feel guilty when you use Amazon or Uber after protesting their treatment of workers, as if it were hypocritical to demand the destruction of a service you use every day. A wellorganized strategic boycott is a powerful tool, but the degree to which the left has internalized ethical consumerism is frankly dangerous. It means that when a progressive hears about Facebook accepting lies in paid political ads, they think their job is to stop using Facebook, when they should really call their congressmember and demand that she sponsor legislation that would make social media companies liable for paid lies. Because this antipolitical ideology has infiltrated leftist politics, even progressive politicians are rarely asked to address monopoly problems; meanwhile, monopolies are lining the pockets of most Democratic and Republican candidates to make sure they look the other way.

It is a profound project, to reshape our politics and win back our freedom. But we can break these concentrations of power as soon as we set our minds to the task. We already have the tools at our disposal. Using no more than existing statutes, a new president can demand that the FTC and Department of Justice stop mergers, and implement industry-specific anti-monopoly rules across the executive branch. State attorneys general can—and are starting to— investigate big trusts, block mergers, and force divestiture. A new Congress could certainly help to speed the process, by passing laws that overturn decades of bad Supreme Court precedent and return us to the jurisprudence developed prior to 1981, when it was much easier to stop corporate concentration. That same Congress—and statehouses—can pass anti-monopoly laws directly targeting this modern threat.

With a major, grassroots anti-monopoly movement, we can radically reshape our economy and democracy in the service of human needs. We can have affordable drugs. We can have a wide-open seed market that isn’t connected to a fertilizer market. Farmers can reclaim the right to fix their own tractors, and taxi drivers can get a decent wage. We can have an economy where business owners make a profit but aren’t governed by profit maximization. We can have a basic communications infrastructure that doesn’t rely on targeted ads and surveillance. We can even have an economy made up of worker-owned co-ops and unionized corporations, small- and medium-sized businesses, and substantial local ownership, if we so choose. We can have a moral economy. But none of this will happen until we end government by private monopolies.

### Cap K

#### The 1AC trades off with a materialist approach necessary to confront capitalism

Alyson Escalante 19, M.A., Department of Philosophy @ University of Oregon, 9-08-2019, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge,” https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/

Other thinkers such as Foucault would go on to focus on the way that knowledge relates to power, with an emphasis on the way in which theories of knowledge serve to justify certain arrangements of power. For Foucault, on of most important project is to uncover “subjugated knowledges” which have been obscured by dominant theories of knowledge. History for Foucault is not a matter of class struggle but of decentralized movements of power wherein new ideas combat old. The focus in Foucault’s work is on understanding ideas in relation to an abstract notion of power. This stands in stark contrast to the Marxist view which understands ideas in relation to the material conditions of the world in which we live, with primary emphasis given to the class arrangement of our society. Foucault denounced Marxism as an outdated mode of thought that was thoroughly trapped within older theories of knowledge and certainty. As such, he pushed against an emphasis on class struggle and instead promoted an abstract idea of resistance which could be enacted on a local and personal level. For Foucault, there is no objective truth that can be uncovered; instead there are competing discourses which can be understood in their specific historical moments.

There are countless other postmodern and proto-postmodern thinkers who embraced skepticism for various reasons. These thinkers mostly focused on the historically bound nature of knowledge, emphasizing the way that our own historical and social context limit our ability to understand the world around us. They facilitated a shift in politics from collective class struggle against our class enemies to local resistance to abstract and ill-defined notions of power. In this sense, they used skepticism to push back against the possibility of a revolutionary science.

I will not refute these theorists here, because I am attempting to write specifically to other Marxists who desire to better understand a the theory of knowledge which underpins scientific socialism. It is worth nothing however, that these theorists rejected the very epistemological core of Marxism and therefore served bourgeois interests. If truth cannot actually be attained, if knowledge is nothing more than competing discourses, then it is not possible for us to come up with a universal and unified theory of knowledge which could guide revolutionary struggle. As such, Marxists must insist on the possibility for true ideas to be ascertained. We must insist that practice in the form of revolutionary struggle can help us develop true ideas, and we must demonstrate that those ideas in turn further our struggle and help us achieve success.

We must be able to look to past struggles and determine which universal truths were derived from those struggles. We can look to the October revolution, for example, and see that Lenin’s theory of a revolutionary vanguard party showed itself to be correct in the Russian revolutionary struggle. We can further see that it continued to be proved correct in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. Therefore, we can insist that the Leninist theory of the revolutionary vanguard party is true. For Marxists, this isn’t a matter of opinion, it’s not a historical truth bound to the 20th century, and it’s not just one discourse of revolution competing with others. Marxism must stand at odds with skeptical and postmodern theories of knowledge in order for it to claim to be a scientific approach to socialism at all.

The problem is not simply that skepticism has been used by bourgeois liberals to reject Marxism. Although he is not a Marxist himself, philosopher Bruno Latour has demonstrated that postmodern skepticism of truth and the possibility of developing a scientific approach to politics has become a tool for explicitly reactionary and right wing political actors. In his text, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam, Latour notes that right wing capitalists have weaponized the language of skepticism and the limits of scientific knowledge to deny the reality of climate change. Capitalists have begun to obscure their own destruction of the environment by insisting that scientific knowledge isn’t totally possible, and that science is just one more discourse among many. They insist that we cannot trust the scientific evidence of capitalist driven climate change because science is just one theory of knowledge which can’t be said to be universally true. He notes that the Foucault’s conflation of knowledge with power has not challenged imperialist institutions, evidenced by the fact that the US DARPA intelligence unit has adopted the motto “knowledge is power.” The idea that truth does not exist, or that it is not knowable, has not challenged capitalist and fascist social forces, it has only aided them by attempting to destroy the scientific basis of revolutionary resistance to capitalism.

Unfortunately, many on the left have embraced a sort of postmodern skepticism towards the possibility of truth. In doing so, they have abandoned the central epistemological core of Marxism. It is crucial for Marxists today to insist that truth exists, can be ascertained, and that only practice is capable of ascertaining it. If we abandon this view, we abandon the ability to wield knowledge as a weapon against the capitalist class. That is something that we cannot allow.

#### Unchecked capitalism will cause extinction. Organizing without central planning and state organizing dooms capitalist resistance.

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

Let’s look at this third option more closely. To build towards an eco-communist revolution, we need to avoid both a politics of pure negation and a politics of “critical affirmation.” As Marx argued, revolutions need dialectics. They need us to find what Fredric Jameson calls the “dialectical ambivalence” in capitalism. This means training ourselves to locate aspects of the present that point beyond themselves and towards the communist horizon. Lenin did precisely this after the outbreak of the First World War. Rather than joining with the majority of the socialist parties of the Second International in capitulating to imperialist war, and rather than wallowing in melancholia following the betrayal of so many of his German comrades as they voted for war credits, Lenin saw in the war an opportunity for revolutionary advance. Those interested in the emancipation of the working class needed to fight not for peace but for the dialectical conversion of nationalist war to civil war. The war, and the collapse of the Second International, was the opportunity for something new.

What would it mean to think dialectically about the GND? We think it would mean stripping the policy’s reformist content away from its revolutionary form. For decades environmental movements in the capitalist core have busied themselves fighting for local solutions to global problems: cooperatives, local currencies, urban agriculture, and ethical consumerism. As these experiments blossomed, the climate crisis continued unabated. More pipelines were built, more indigenous land was stolen, more fires raged, and more species flickered out of existence.

In their form the GND and GIR put localism aside. Both recognize that the climate crisis demands a state-led, centrally planned, and global response. They take for granted that we need a state to intervene on behalf of nature and workers against capital. The fact that the GND and GIR promise to do this is what makes capitalists fear them. Those who are excited about the promise of the GND—such as Riofrancos—have similarly turned towards the state as a terrain of struggle and a locus of power. Consciously or not, these movements have learned from the failures of Climate Camp, Occupy, and the Movement of Squares. It is not enough to suspend the normal running of things. Taking responsibility means taking power and organizing society in what Marx called the interests of “freely associated workers,” or more controversially, the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The struggles to implement the GND and GIR tell us that environmentalists are increasingly aware of the need to seize the state—and the need to develop a fighting organization with the capacity to do so.

Against State Denialism

Ironically, at almost the precise moment that progressive movements have become conscious of the necessity of a climate response operating at the necessary scale, the Marxist left has taken a state-phobic turn. Consider “disaster communism.” Confronted with the choice between ruin or revolution, disaster communism opts for ruin as the path to revolution—without considering the form of association necessary to ensure that the revolution ushers in a more equal, just, and sustainable world rather than insulated groups struggling with each other over resources. In lieu of the revolutionary subject emphasized in the Marxist tradition, disaster communism turns to climate breakdown as the agent of history.

Drawing on Rebecca Solnit’s book A Paradise Built in Hell, a study of how practices of mutual aid and collectivity arise in the aftermath of crises, disaster communists argue that we do not need to seize the state because the state will be washed away, along with the capitalist system itself, as the full force of the climate crisis crashes down around us. While Solnit emphasizes the ephemerality of “disaster communities,” disaster communists ask how these communities might be sustained and even flourish well beyond the punctual point of a climatic disaster wrought by capitalism. Theirs is a vision of communism arising, triumphantly, from capital’s ashes. Vision may be too strong a term here: for the most part, disaster communism is a hope, a screen covering over the need for organization and planning at a scale that can produce a form of life suitable for billions of people and nonhuman species.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic illustrate the point. Even as mobilized volunteers and mutual aid can meet real needs by distributing meals, assisting neighbors, and coordinating webinars, they are inadequate to the most demanding tasks of developing and administering tests for the virus, securing hospital beds in intensive care units, producing and distributing respirators, and providing adequate protective equipment at the necessary scale. Mutual aid is inspiring, but it’s not enough—it can’t stop the hoarders and profiteers, pay hospital bills and unemployment insurance, release prisoners and detainees. It doesn’t scale, particularly when the prevailing logic comes from the market. That capital accumulation takes place through dispossession as well as exploitation brings home the real limit of mutual aid: poor and working people do not own the means of production and therefore production does not meet social needs.

Furthermore, in extreme capitalist countries like the US and the UK, social and political diversity means that many do not voluntarily comply with public health recommendations. Employers insist that employees come to work. Students spend spring break at the beach. Individuals approach their own situations in terms of exceptions, reasons why they don’t need to comply with directives. Orders from the state don’t eliminate all these exceptions. But they reduce them substantially, most significantly by preventing employers from requiring workers to put themselves at risk. Were the state used as an instrument of working class power, it would, at a minimum, guarantee that workers would continue to be paid, that the health and well-being of people would be the focus of government attention. The pandemic demonstrates a truth that the left’s responses to climate change have been slow to acknowledge: global problems require a centrally planned response with all the tools that are at the disposal of the state. Failing to seize hospitals, industry, banks, and logistical networks from the capitalist class results in needless death—and gives a green light to disaster capitalism.

Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s 2018 book Climate Leviathan provides another state-phobic response to the climate crisis. Mann and Wainwright predict four possible resolutions to the climate crisis. The first is “Climate Leviathan.” This is a global sovereign power that would act in the interests of capitalist states and global capital to limit the effects of climate breakdown. This is effectively the scenario hoped for by Chakrabarty. The second is “Climate Behemoth.” Here, states cannot agree to constitute a global sovereign power and so the crisis is tackled by international capital in the interests of international capital. The third is “Climate Mao.” In this scenario a single authoritarian sovereign power, most likely China, leads global mitigation and adaptation efforts. Finally, their fourth and preferred scenario is “Climate X.” This would be a so-far-nonexistent social movement that struggles to resolve the crisis in a way that is simultaneously anti-capitalist and anti-sovereign.

Alyssa Battistoni and Patrick Bigger have already written compelling Marxist critiques of Climate Leviathan. We don’t need to rehearse them here. We note, however, that responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resembled Climate Behemoth and Climate Mao. While the US, UK, and EU have been slow to use state power to coordinate either within or among the themselves, instead following the dictates and interests of capital in their structuring of economic responses to the pandemic, China has modeled both rigorous state action with respect to quarantines and international leadership with respect to provision of medical aid. What’s important for our argument here is that Mann and Wainwright’s state denialism prevents them from conceiving the state as a form for the collective power of working people, an instrument through which we remake the economy in the service of human and nonhuman life.

Jasper Bernes offers a third state-phobic Marxist response to the climate crisis. A proponent of communization theory, Bernes argues that communism means “the immediate abolition of money and wages, of state power, and of administrative centralization.” Absent something like a state, how is a just response to the climate crisis even possible? Should we assume that it will spontaneously emerge as a result of disparate local disaster communisms? Should we assume that access to food, water, living space, and capacities for self-defense will be equally distributed, that by some miracle the immediate abolition of money and wages will leave everyone in the same position? The pandemic gives us insight into the inability of the communization approach to respond to catastrophe: when millions who have been dependent on the wage are without it, they require centralized state power to seize the means of production and distribution and administer both on the scale necessary to meet social needs. The issue isn’t the power of the state. It’s the class wielding state power.

#### The alternative is to endorse a democratic global anti-capitalist movement.

Valentine Moghadam 20, Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Northeastern University, and former Director of the International Affairs Program, “Planetize the Movement!,” April 2020, Great Transition Initiative, https://greattransition.org/images/Planetize-Movement-Moghadam.pdf

The Historical Conjuncture

In January 2020, as I was writing this essay, Americans celebrated the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whose message of social equality, economic justice, and peace is as relevant today as ever—arguably more so. That month, the US and Iran (the country of my birth) seemed to be on the brink of war. Australia was experiencing climate change-related disaster, the opioid crisis continued to devastate communities and families across the US, and refugees and migrants still faced exclusion and disdain. Income inequality in the US and in many other countries grew ever wider, as the power of capital over labor remained strong. Across the globe, the rightward march of populist politics continued apace.

This is only a small list of the world’s problems, some of which are common to humanity and some specific to nation-states and communities. To echo Lenin, what is to be done? For an answer, we can echo Dr. King: “planetize our movement.”1 But what is “the movement,” and how can it be planetized?

The World Social Forum, launched in 2001 to assert that a “another world is possible,” attracted civil society organizations and social movements from across the globe, many of them associated with what scholars called the global justice movement, or “the movement of movements.”2 Then came the global financial crisis, followed by the Arab Spring demanding the fall of authoritarian and corrupt regimes, the European summer of anti-austerity protests, and Occupy Wall Street (OWS), with its rallying cry against the privileged 1%.

A decade later, we face a weakened and increasingly irrelevant WSF, the modest harvest of the Arab Spring along with failed states, the demise of OWS, entrenched neoliberalism, and unabated militarism. These developments have wreaked havoc on communities in the Global South, generating the refugee and migrant waves that resulted in the right-wing populist backlash. Meanwhile, right-wing populist leaders have appropriated some of the grievances and even language of the Left—especially the very early critiques of neoliberal capitalist globalization, as well as the unions’ despair over labor’s displacement and stagnating wages—to win over citizens in country after country.

From a world-historical perspective, we are living in a period similar to the early twentieth century, during which the British Empire was losing its global hegemony.3 That period led to inter-imperialist rivalries, the Great War, the expansion of socialism and communism, the fascist reaction, and the Second World War. Today, US hegemony is similarly in decline, and the transition and chaos we experience include growing powers challenging that hegemony (China, Russia, Iran); military adventures and the destabilization of states by the US and its allies (e.g., Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, Honduras 2009, Libya 2011, Syria since 2011, Yemen since 2015); right-wing populist political parties and governments; and the ecological crisis.

The moment is ripe for an alternative. Labor unrest has grown around the world, encompassing industrial workers, teachers, health workers, janitors, and others across the Middle East and North Africa, in Latin America, and even in the US. Indeed, we may be nearing a classic Leninist “revolutionary situation,” which could be the culmination of “the world revolution of 20xx.”4 If so, the Global Left should be better prepared to meet the challenge.

The good news is that there is a “new Global Left” that enjoys a multitude of emerging movements, including climate justice groups led by young people.5 The rich array of activist groups and the dynamism and passion they display excite a sense of possibility. However, the very diversity of movements and their weak interconnection could constrain the Global Left’s ability to achieve meaningful change.6 Without consensus around a common agenda, how are we to make the great transition from an entrenched global system based on capitalist profit, top-down decisionmaking, war, and environmental degradation to a world where people and the planet take center stage in politics and policy? Surely we need not only resistance on a multiplicity of grounds, but also agreement on a clear, coherent, and feasible alternative to the unjust, undemocratic, and unsustainable status quo.

A Missing Global Actor

The socialist and communist movements and parties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pinned their hopes on the capacity of a united working class, defined as a largely male industrial laboring class (“the proletariat”), to tame and challenge capitalism. In the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the nature of that class changed, now encompassing a broader spectrum of working people, such as those in public and private services (including care workers) who labor under the supervision of highly paid managers and administrators, along with the precariat and gig economy workers. On the Left, however, many do not regard that more inclusive working class as a central actor, despite its composition spanning race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and gender.7

Instead, today’s movements—certainly in the US—seem to define actors based on particular identities and interests. Rather than the singular actor of yore (the working class), today there is a multiplicity of actors across numerous movements. The question arises as to whether such a multiplicity of actors can generate the necessary coordination and craft a strategy to challenge the powers-that-be—economic and political elites situated in national governments; in the financial, corporate, and military sectors; and in institutions of global governance. If those elites are so well connected, why is it so difficult for our numerous movements to coalesce around a shared identity and agenda?

In my estimation, the Left has lost sight of the proverbial forest for the proverbial trees. It has gotten far too caught up in culture wars and battles over identity, forgetting the centrality of political economy to the hidden injuries not only of class, but also of race and ethnicity, women’s subordination, the destruction of the commons, and inter- and intra-state rivalries, violence, and war. This strategic shift away from political economy has removed the Left’s traditional constituency—the working class in all its breadth and diversity—from a meaningful role. The shift also has confused the Left’s priorities. For instance, we cannot truly address the problems of racism and discrimination without giving urgent attention to the systemic problems of class: low-income communities devastated by precarious employment, the loss of public investment, dirty air and water, poor-quality schooling, and bad health.

The politics of class cannot be divorced from those of race and of sex, because class is imbued with race and sex, and race and sex are themselves imbued with class. Under patriarchal and racist capitalism, there is no class exploitation without racial and sexual oppression. The separation of the three intersecting dimensions across unconnected movements—often lacking in understanding of and solidarity with each other—is among the unfortunate outcomes of our times, caused to some degree by partial, segmented internal politics, but largely by the relentless and effective political, cultural, and ideological campaigns of the ruling elites.

Catalytic Action Now

In the wake of the global financial crisis, it became clear that the world needed a new economic system. Change did not come about, however. To offer a viable alternative to financialization and runaway “shareholderism,” movements need to stand for workplace democracy and shared management, and for long-term rational and people-oriented planning over short-term profit. Although breaking up huge corporations should be the goal, taxing them adequately and using the revenue for societal needs and rights, not for continued militarism, can steer society in the right direction in the interim.

At the same time, we also need to think bigger. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that socialist and communist experiments all ended in failure, I believe that there is a lot we can learn from them. Indeed, this “failure literature” lacks balance and historical accuracy. The great socialist, communist, and liberation movements of the past may not have accomplished all that they could have or intended to, but they were very effective providing education and culture for the poor and imparting the legacy of equality, economic justice, and women’s advancement. The Communist movement had its shortcomings, but it promoted women’s equality and racial equality, supported numerous liberation movements, and checked capitalist and imperialist expansion.

In contrast, our recent movements have failed even in the short run. They may have changed the subject—certainly OWS highlighted the problem of income inequalities and helped reintroduce capitalism and its flaws into the national conversation in the US—but they could not compel change of the system itself, much less dislodge its major actors and beneficiaries. Unlike the progressive movements of the late nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century that gave us socialism and social democracy, an end to British colonialism, Third World development, and the demise of authoritarianism in southern Europe, the movements of the twenty-first century have not been able to make headway in structural or systemic terms. Instead, the collapse of world communism—celebrated across the globe—actually generated new crises and chaos.

One response to the crisis has been the new municipalism, which aims to implement localized democratic practices and people-oriented resource allocation. In one promising example, the administration of the Communist mayor of Santiago, Chile, has created a “people’s pharmacy,” offered cheap eye-care and glasses, increased public housing, and embraced leftist approaches to community safety, among other progressive people-oriented initiatives.8 But localism is not enough, as many of our problems are global in nature. The recklessness of the financial sector has had ripple effects across borders; the obsession with economic growth and capital accumulation has generated a massive, global environmental crisis. That brilliant experiment in radical democratic feminist municipalism—Rojava in northern Syria—was overturned in October 2019 by a brutal Turkish invasion facilitated by the Trump administration. Thus, we must heed Dr. King’s message to “take the nonviolent movement international” and to planetize it.

The Global Left and its infrastructure remain fragmented and disconnected, except for periodic mass rallies against the most egregious actions of global capitalism and imperial states. But it wasn’t always so. Once, vibrant Internationals were organized to guide and promote a worldwide movement. The influential First International, initially called the International Workingmen’s Association, was formed in 1864, but contention between the anarchist and socialist wings led to its demise in the late 1870s. Its successor, the Second International, had great success, but fractured in the run-up to World War I. The Third International formed after the Russian revolution to unite socialist and communist groups from across Europe and Asia, but later, under Stalin, became corrupted into the highly centralized Comintern.9

Both the successes and the failures of these Internationals offer vital lessons: a powerful worldwide movement could be premised on both a global political organization with a strategy for change and the strength of plural and diverse movements that call the status quo into question. To move forward, we need to look back at the old Internationals and, at the same time, not give up on the World Social Forum. The crises and injustices of our times call for both a coordinated “united front” and a loosely aligned “popular front.”

Some say the language of the past—socialism, communism, planning—is outmoded and unlikely to resonate. And yet, many young people embrace the term socialism; in the US, they rallied around Bernie Sanders’s call for “democratic socialism,” and in the UK, they coalesced around the Labour Party’s left-wing faction, Momentum, and its leader, Jeremy Corbyn. In Tunisia, where young people are losing hope in capitalist democracy because of high unemployment and other economic difficulties, the left-wing student union UGET and the many young supporters of the Front Populaire call for planning and a strong welfare state. Around the world, women have come together around a more inclusive, transformative vision of feminism, which some call “feminism for the 99%.”10 The “left nationalism” of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Kurds is also part of the new Global Left and could help constitute a global movement against capitalism, militarism, and oligarchic states.

The world’s injustices as well as new possibilities for alliance have inspired calls for coordinated forms of organizing. The late Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin, for instance, called for a Fifth International.11 But to balance the complementary needs of global coordination and plural autonomy, two Internationals may be needed, one that remains horizontally based—the movement of movements—and the other vertically organized, drawing inspiration and lessons from the old Internationals.

What might this mean in practical, strategic terms? To start, we should revitalize the World Social Forum.12 It encompasses diverse grievances, identities, and interests; it remains the site for dialogic discussion and the cultivation of solidarity across movements; and it has resisted the authoritarian impulses and practices of capital and the state. It can remain an open space for dialogue among place-based and identity-expressive movements. Building up the Global Left and helping advance a Great Transition, however, requires a global political organization to do the necessary crossmovement “translation” work and deliver a plan for structural change at national, regional, and global levels. Accomplishing this will be an arduous task, but we can’t afford to wait.

Whether it is called the Fifth International, the United Front, the Progressive International, or the World Party, such an organization would be vertically organized, along the lines of the earlier Internationals but with the involvement of anti-imperialist feminist groups such as Code Pink, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Marche Mondiale des Femmes, and the new Feminist Foreign Policy Project. This planetized formation would encompass progressive parties, anti-neoliberal unions, and anti-war movements across the globe. It would practice democratic decision-making and offer a clear vision and mission of an alternative system of production, social reproduction, trade, and international relations. It would revive the 2011 Arab Spring call, “The people want the fall of the regime,” and create a powerful message demanding a re-enactment of what occurred in 1989/1990, but in reverse: “The people want the fall of the ruling capitalist elites.”

## Case

#### Antitrust debates are good---rigorous and iterative research gives us the tools to challenge violent corporate monopolization.

Greer and Rice 21 – Jeremie Greer and Solana Rice are Co-founders and Co-executives of Liberation in a Generation, a national movement-support organization working to build the power of people of color to transform the economy.

Jeremie Greer and Solana Rice, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power Through Racial Justice,” *Liberation in a Generation*, March 2021, pp. 3-13, https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism\_032021.pdf.

It is critical that grassroots leaders of color are positioned to lead on anti-monopoly policy, as they are uniquely positioned to understand its impact on people of color at the household, community, and societal levels. This gives them a unique perspective in policy ideation efforts that should be valued and validated. These leaders also possess the unique skills to mobilize the people and public power that are necessary to force the government to reclaim its historic role of reining in runaway corporate monopoly power.

We at Liberation in a Generation believe that the power to change our economic systems rests with the organizers of color who are building the political strength of communities of color. Anti-monopoly research and advocacy need to better quantify, center, and reflect what people of color are experiencing and the ways that they are being harmed by monopoly power’s reach. These efforts should also better connect anti-monopoly policy and advocacy as tools to advance the existing priorities of leaders of color, such as the Green New Deal, Medicare for All, closing the racial wealth gap, and a Homes Guarantee. This paper aims to contribute a major step in the long journey of bridging the divide between anti-monopoly researchers and policy advocates and grassroots leaders of color. The first step on that journey is knowledge.

Recognizing that anti-monopoly work is a new policy issue to many grassroots leaders of color, this paper will serve as a primer to 1) educate grassroots leaders on the issue of corporate concentration, 2) connect the issue to racial justice, and 3) recommend a path forward for grassroots leaders as well as the researchers and advocates who need to embrace them. Our hope is that this paper provides a foundation of knowledge that grassroots leaders of color can use to build race-conscious solutions and mobilize for action to rein in runaway corporate monopoly power. To that end, the paper is organized into six sections.

SECTION 1 Monopoly Power Is Corporate Power Magnified and Maximized

In 1975, millions flooded theaters to see the blockbuster thriller Jaws. The story follows a police chief in a small resort town as he risks his life to protect beachgoers from a monstrous man-eating great white shark.

Monopolies are a lot like the shark in Jaws. While enormous, ruthless, dangerous, and scary, the movie’s monster is just a shark, and the police chief uses tools and community to defeat it. Comparatively, while also enormous, ruthless, dangerous, and even scary, monopolies are just corporations, and we, together, can confront them. Their massive power controls the wages we earn, the prices we pay, and the actions of the politicians who are supposed to represent us in DC, the statehouse, and city hall. In a representative democracy, we the people are at the top of the food chain, and it is within our power to make these monopolies fear us— and end their existence in the first place.

Grassroots leaders of color are highly experienced and uniquely skilled at challenging corporate power, and these capacities can and should be used to curb monopoly power. For example, the Athena Coalition8 has successfully leveraged grassroots power to challenge the monopoly power of Amazon, and Color of Change9 has effectively used grassroots digital organizing to challenge the monopoly power of social media platforms such as Facebook. Putting monopolies in the crosshairs of organizers is critical because they best understand the real human and structural devastation caused by monopoly power, which is otherwise all too easily neglected.

Though we believe that grassroots leaders of color have the experience and expertise necessary to challenge monopoly power, the question remains: Why should they lead this fight? Grassroots leaders of color are already engaged in high-stakes battles with the forces of corporate power on fundamental issues, including environmental justice, worker justice, housing justice, prison and police abolition, and voter and democratic justice. We believe that these efforts can be bolstered if anti-monopoly policy development and advocacy were incorporated into these existing efforts but then followed the lead of organizers. For example, the primary opponents of prison and police abolition are private prison monopolies, such as GEO Group and CoreCivic, which profit from the arrest and incarceration of Black and brown people. Opponents of the Green New Deal include energy monopolies BP and ExxonMobile, whose profits are derived from polluting Black and brown communities.10 Finally, opponents of the Homes Guarantee, and its call for creating 12 million units of social housing outside of the for-profit housing market, include big banks that profit from the commodification of affordable and low-income housing. Challenging these opponents by diminishing their monopoly power could prove to be a powerful weapon in the fight to dismantle unchecked corporate power and its real-life economic impact on people of color.

How Corporate Monopolies Show Up in Today’s World

The distinguishing features of monopolies, when compared to your run of the mill corporation (large or small), are the reach and intensity of the corporate power that they wield. Monopoly power turbocharges the ills of corporate power and creates a wider impact of the overlapping consequences for people. In many ways, monopolies are created when corporate power becomes governing power.11 Their sheer size and market dominance allow them to govern markets, and their expansive wealth gives them the power to manipulate prices, crush workers, and steamroll governments. Ultimately, monopolies’ extreme economic power—which they use to gain outsized political power and then more economic power—undermines the collective power of workers, consumers, small businesses, local communities, and governments.

It has become difficult, and inadequate, to rely on legal definitions to identify monopolies. The legal definition of monopolization is highly technical and complicated by centuries of conflicting jurisprudence. It's been narrowed to exclusively focus on the negative impact that anticompetitive actions have on consumers.12 This narrower focus intentionally shielded monopolies from any accountability for anticompetitive harm inflicted on workers, the environment, local communities, government, and democracy. Federal enforcement of monopoly power is confined to the highly specialized legal practice of antitrust law enforcement.13 However, centuries of political power wielded by corporate monopolies and their acolytes (e.g., universities, think tanks, trade associations, and major law firms) have rendered much of antitrust law enforcement toothless.14

In the late 19th and early 20th century, the definition of monopoly was much wider and comprehensive. In this paper, we will expand the definition as well. Recognizing that this definitional work is in many ways a work in progress, we offer our definition as a point of discussion and debate for the larger field of anti-monopoly advocates.

In this paper, we define monopoly as a corporate entity (a single corporation or a group of corporations) whose sheer size and anticompetitive behavior grant it disproportionate economic power and governing influence. This negatively affects the well-being of workers, consumers, markets, local communities, democratic governance, and the planet.

Below are a few major industries that reveal how corporate concentration and monopolistic industries harm the economic lives of workers, consumers, and communities of color.

Big Tech

Four corporations comprise what has come to be known as “Big Tech”: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Alphabet (the parent company of Google). Each of these technology firms dominate an enormous share of their respective technology markets. Google, for example, controls 90 percent of the internet search market, and it controls the largest video sharing platform on the internet through its ownership of YouTube. Apple controls 50 percent of the cellphone market,15 and Amazon controls 50 percent of all ecommerce. Facebook and its many subsidiaries (such as WhatsApp and Instagram) dominate the social media and online advertising marketplace.16 Other technology firms, including Uber, Lyft, Microsoft, and Netflix, also demonstrate monopolistic, anticompetitive behavior in their respective markets. In many ways, these companies, and the people who control them, are the “robber barons” of our time.

Big Pharma

The world's largest pharmaceutical corporations, including Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Merck, Gilead, Amgen, and AbbVie, together comprise “Big Pharma.” These monopolies build their profits by controlling the prices of critical life-saving pharmaceuticals (e.g., insulin, drugs that regulate blood pressure, and critical antibiotics) and life-altering medical devices (e.g., heart stents and joint replacement devices). Between 2000 and 2018, a disproportionately small number of pharmaceutical companies made a combined $11 trillion in revenue and $8.6 trillion in gross profits.17 In 2014, the top 10 pharmaceutical companies had 38 percent of the industry’s total sales revenue.18 Much of these profits were gained driving up the price of critical drugs , extorting research and development (R&D) funding from the government, and leveraging Big Pharma’s political influence to weaken government oversight of the industry.19

Big Agriculture

Big Agriculture, or “Big Ag,” refers to monopolies that control major aspects of the global food supply chain. This includes companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Bayer, and John Deere. Though once a diffuse network of small farmers and supply chain companies, recent mergers have created a system comprising a small number of corporations that are crowding out smaller, family-run companies including small farms. Similar to Big Pharma, government subsidies are a massive component of the obscene profits made by Big Ag. Further, as often the largest employer in many small rural towns, these corporations often ruthlessly wield their monopoly power to drive down wages and benefits to workers, skirt government safety regulations, and bully (and even buy out) small farmers.

Big Banks

Known as the “Big Five,” five banks control almost half of the industry’s nearly $15 trillion in financial assets: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and US Bancorp. Their collective importance to the nation’s financial system has led some to consider them “too big to fail.”20 In fact, in response to the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government provided trillions of dollars in relief to ensure that they did not collapse under the weight of the crisis.21 The Big Five have an incredible influence over the flow of money throughout our economy. They finance critical goods and services, such as housing, higher education, infrastructure, and renewable energy. They also finance extractive elements of our economy, such as fossil fuels and private prisons. But, most importantly, they set the rules for who can and cannot access loan capital, and their exclusionary practices have been widely linked to the growth of racial wealth inequality (as described in Section 3).

#### Monopoly capitalism worsens every form of oppression and antitrust advocacy strengthens every angle of resistance.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power.

The Racial Wealth Gap

Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place.

Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite.

Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality.

• Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38

• Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39

• Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40

• Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41

• Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans).

The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists.

The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt.

America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration

The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46

As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions.

Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6.

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements

There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities.

To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.Discourses that “people belong to land” turns all defined outside the land into colonizers – this separation justifies genocide.

Sharma ’20 [Nandita; Professor of Sociology @ University of Hawaii – Manoa, PhD in Sociology and Equity Studies @ University of Toronto; “The National Politics of Separation” in *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*, Duke University Press, p. 1-35; AS]

National Autochthonies

National autochthonous discourses are a legacy of imperialism. Having constructed a Manichean binary of European/Native, fearful imperial states, beginning with the British Empire’s containment of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, regained control by separating colonized Natives into two, supposedly distinct, groups: “Indigenous-Natives” and “Migrant-Natives,” with the former regarded as more native than the latter (Mamdani 2012). The basis of this imperial distinction was the idea that a primordial relationship existed between a certain group of people and a designated place. Indigenous-Natives, not unlike certain flora and fauna, were portrayed as being “of the place,” further naturing them in the process. Migrant-Natives, on the other hand, were portrayed as being subsequent settlers from outside the colony and therefore not of it.

Both categories were codified in imperial law so that the two categories of colonized Natives were governed by dif­ferent laws. These laws, which included differential allocations of land, political rights, and power for people in the two groups, materialized the differences between Indigenous-Natives and Migrant-Natives. Indigenous-Natives were granted formal access to territories and political rights on it through “Native authorities.” Migrant-Natives were not. Such imperial distinctions profoundly reshaped politics in the colonies and informed how national liberation movements imagined which people were the People of the nation. Nationalists took the imperial idea of indigeneity as a stable and static group and retooled it to fit the nations they were in the process of creating. With “independence,” the imperialist meanings attached to both Natives and Migrants were relocated to nationalized territory. When the colonies and, later, imperial metropoles nationalized their sovereignties from the late nineteenth century, claims to national status were underpinned by claims to autochthonous belonging. Being Native, once the denigrated Other to the colonizer, has, in the Postcolonial New World Order, become the quintessential criterion for being a member of the nation. Migrants, unable to cross the racialized boundary of Nativeness (at least in the places they actually live) and unable to organize themselves into a nation, remain “out of place.”

Placing people into separated categories of National-Natives and Migrants is no trifling matter. People’s relationship to nation-states, to national political bodies, and to one another are organized by the rights associated with the category people find themselves in. Across the world system of nation-states, a further contraction of the already limited criteria of national belonging has taken place around the figure of the National-Native. At the same time, an expansion of the term “colonizer” has occurred, one that encompasses all those seen to be Migrants. Borrowing the imperial meaning of Natives as colonized people, National-Natives see themselves as “colonized” by Migrants. In turn, Migrants’ own experience of colonization is seen as unimportant—and unpolitical. Instead Migrants are demonized as destroyers of nations.

Today, national autochthony is increasingly important to nationalist projects, both from above and from below. Most troubling, the legal and/or social separation of National-Natives and Migrants animates deadly conflicts around the world. A particularly stark example of this is taking place in Myanmar (formerly Burma), where the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the basis for what has been termed the world’s most recent genocide, this time against Rohingya people (International State Crime Initiative, Queen Mary University of London, 2015). Nation-state officials and popular Buddhist monks categorize (mostly) Muslim Rohingya people as “illegal Bengali migrants” and argue that expelling them from both the nation and its sovereign territory is necessary for the defense of national society (see Foucault 1978, 137; Foucault 2003). Over the past four decades, Rohingya people have had their homes and property destroyed; they have been tortured, killed, and placed in camps; their citizenship has been removed; and a growing number have been forced to flee. Having already been socially constituted as Migrants, many have been made Migrants both in national law and in everyday life.

Treating Rohingya people as deportable people without rights, Myanmar has constructed approximately sixty-seven camps and moved about 140,000 Rohingya people into them since 2012. Many observers regard these camps as nothing less than concentration camps (Motlagh 2014; Fortify Rights 2015; Kristof 2016). Since 2015, violence against Rohingya people has intensified further. From late August 2017 to January 2018, two-thirds of all Rohingya people in Myanmar—an estimated 688,000 people—fled to Bangladesh to escape attacks from Myanmar’s military (see Ibrahim 2018; unhcr 2018). Bangladesh, meanwhile, is trying to force them “home.” Rohingya people are thus simultaneously victims of both the hardening criteria for national citizenship in Myanmar and the intensification of national immigration controls in Bangladesh and other nation-states, which try to deny them a new life elsewhere. Made stateless, Rohingya people have thus been made subject to the coercive power of all nation-states.

Another stark example of the political work done by separating NationalNatives from Migrants is the popular “Save Darfur” movement, which has successfully reframed the economic, political, and ecological legacies of European imperialism in the Darfur region of Sudan as a racialized conflict between “Black African” National-Natives and “light-skinned Arab” Migrants. Playing directly into the hands of oil companies, this division has further fueled the Islamophobic U.S.-led war on terror in the region. Probably the best-studied example of the violence ensuing from the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when those acting in the name of Hutus killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and those Hutus who opposed this mass murder. Such state-organized killings were evident at least as far back as the first murderous attacks against Tutsis by Hutus in the lead-up to Rwanda’s 1961 declaration of national independence. From that time on, the self-identification of Hutus as the National-Natives of Rwanda and the categorization of Tutsis as colonizing Migrants was consistently used to violently expunge Tutsis from the national political body.

A not dissimilar process took place in the 1991–2002 Yugoslav Wars. Ideas of National-Native belonging fueled the claims to Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian homelands. In each national territory, people targeted for “ethnic cleansing” were said to be Migrants and thus foreign elements in the national homelands of others. A total of 140,000 people were killed, with another two million people displaced. In Myanmar, Sudan, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, women’s bodies were abstracted as national symbols. Consequently, rape was a major weapon of war used to define national populations (Chinkin 1994; Agamben 1998; Kesic 2002). No one was spared. Combatants on all sides targeted women for either being Native to the enemy or being the Migrant enemy.

These are only some of the better reported—and most murderous— events where the politics of separating National-Natives from Migrants has been central. Organized through a politics of autochthony, each has employed the politics of home rule to exclude, expel, and even to systematically exterminate those constituted as Migrants. However, autochthonous politics have also been the prime basis for the indigenization of numerous African states, such as Idi Amin’s forced expulsion of “Asians” from Uganda in 1972; they are also fundamental to military coup d’états unseating democratically elected “Asian” parliamentary leaders in Fiji; and they are at the core of moral panics over “Migrant invasions” across Europe.

#### “Reorientation of the self towards Land” fuel the violence of the world capitalist system – calls for Native sovereignty fragments the global labor market and divides workers into citizen and migrant.

Sharma ’20 [Nandita; Professor of Sociology @ University of Hawaii – Manoa, PhD in Sociology and Equity Studies @ University of Toronto; “The National Politics of Separation” in *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*, Duke University Press, p. 1-35; AS]

Postcolonial Biopolitics of Citizenship and Immigration Controls

The enactment of immigration controls historically distinguishes nation-states from other forms of state power. Imperial states were largely intent on bringing as many people into imperial territory as possible. This is captured in the Roman Empire’s maxim of imperium sine fine, an empire without end or limit. Limitlessness through the expansion of imperial territory and numbers of imperial subjects was a key part of imperial projects. “Barbarians,” people at the edges of imperial-state power, were declared “uncivilized”—and threatening. Empires thus strived to bring these people (and the places they lived) in. The more people whose lives imperial states controlled—to labor, pay taxes, soldier—the more power imperial rulers had. For this reason, James Scott (2017) refers to the earliest states in the Near East, formed about five thousand years ago, as “population machines.”

Like all states, imperial states also controlled people’s mobility. It is not for nothing that an origin of “state” is “stasis,” or immobility (Bridget Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009). However, imperial states were primarily concerned with preventing people’s escape from imperial territory. Simultaneously, imperial states also moved people into imperial-state spaces across numerous continents and archipelagos, largely to labor or fight for its glory. Indeed, empires developed entire systems of movement, including Atlantic slavery, convict transportation, and the “coolie” system of indentured labor.4 Imperial-state practices concerning the entry of people into its territories thus operated under what Radhika Mongia (2018) calls a “logic of facilitation.”

Nation-states reversed this imperial order by operating under what Mongia (2018) calls a “logic of constraint.” Borne from the exigencies of the British imperial state seeking to secure a disciplined labor force in the wake of the successes—and ongoing pressure—of slavery abolitionist movements in the early nineteenth century, by that century’s end, immigration controls defined the sovereignty of emergent nation-states, first in the Americas. Indeed, the nationalization of state sovereignty was announced—and institutionalized— by controls limiting both the entry and rights of those who came to be classified as Migrants. Thus, far from a general characteristic of state sovereignty, supposedly in place since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, immigration controls became a hallmark of state sovereignty only with the advent of the nation form of state power.

The nationalization of state sovereignty profoundly reshaped the imperial imagination of the political community, the space and makeup of society, and, importantly, the relationship between the state and those subjected to its rule. Nationalist discourses, promising a horizontal (and cross-class) sameness among Nationals, institutionalized stark differences between Nationals and Migrants. This communitarian basis of nationalized sovereignties produced a shift from imperial to postcolonial racist strategies (R. Miles 1993, 117).

The nationalist process of sorting which people were—and were not— the “people of a place” dramatically bifurcated people’s freedom of mobility. Nation-states largely eliminated imperial exit controls but increasingly regulated and restricted the entry of people. Nationals not only had the exclusive right to enter the nation-state, but they were the only ones with the right to stay. Migrants, in contrast, came to be defined by their deportability (De Genova 2002). Consequently, Migrants were defined as outsiders to national society and its culture—that is, they were made “people out of place.” Importantly, not all people moving across national borders were regarded as Migrants. Nationals of imperial metropoles, and later Rich World states,5 were not only the most likely to be granted permission to enter other nationstates, but they were often not even seen to be Migrants. They were, instead, “ex-pats,” “backpackers,” “adventurers,” and so on, thus adding to the classed character of the figure of the Migrant.

National borders were not only limits or barriers but also conduits for the realization of postcolonial power. Immigration controls created an “environment of life,” one that normalized the fragmentation of a global capitalist labor market into national markets (Bigo 2008, 97). Within each nation-state Citizen workers were seen as having a right to jobs, at least the “good” ones. But within every nation-state were also Migrant Workers who came to constitute a distinct labor-market category by virtue of being defined as “people out of place” (Ng 1988; Sharma 2006). One’s wages, type of jobs, membership in labor unions, formal workplace protections and rights, as well as access to state benefits and services depended on the citizenship and immigration status one held. Thus, citizenship and immigration controls not only produced National-Natives and Migrants, but they also produced highly competitive labor markets. In so doing, they fundamentally strengthened employers’ and states’ ability to exploit and control workers.

A world capitalist system in which nation-states ruled gave capital greater leverage. By the late 1960s, the universalization of the nation-state system occurred alongside the start of neoliberalism. With the addition of new nationstates, the number of competing sites for capital investment grew. Each new nation-state came with the enactment of national immigration controls. Citizenship and immigration controls intensified competition between workers within and across nation-states. The result has been greater disparities of all sorts, perhaps the greatest of which is the infinitely greater mobility rights granted by nation-states to capital investments than to Migrants. Far from being a contradiction, this is, instead, an integral feature of the governmentality of the Postcolonial New World Order.6

Indeed, national citizenship and immigration controls are, together, the key technologies for the material and cultural realization of postcolonial biopower. Disputes over their scope and application are central to the continuous (re)making of the national body politic. As new nations and new nationstates form and older ones dissolve; the unity needed to keep a nation intact is continually challenged. New national liberation movements arise to remake the borders of nationalized territory and set different limits to national belonging. Centripetal as well as centrifugal forces of nationalist thought take place at various state levels: municipal, regional, state, or federal. People may demand that they be reunited with their fellow Nationals (but not fellow citizens) resident in another nation-state’s territory. People may demand more rights for locals over nonlocals in gaining access to property, services, or votes, even when the nonlocals are citizens of the same nation-state. Or they may demand that the nation-state tighten up its immigration controls to better “serve and protect” the nation. Redefining which people are a part of which nation—and which nation should control which territory—secures the body politic as national.

Arguably, with every reimagining of the community as national, a hardening of nationalism takes place, one that further restricts membership in the national political community. Increasingly, the discourse of autochthony is deployed to do this work. Autochthonous discourses restrict national belonging to those who can show they are Native to the nation. In a way, such discourses define national forms of state membership with its ideas of sovereignty over national territory. Thus, even though the state category of Native—which marked the status of colonial subjects—was thought to have disappeared along with empires as colonized Natives become “independent” Nationals, I argue throughout this book that embedded in each idea of national sovereignty—or home rule—is the notion that “true” Nationals are those who are Natives of its territory. By restricting the making of claims to sovereignty, territory, and rights to those who are National-Natives, discourses of autochthony produce borders even more fortified and difficult to cross than those between National and Migrant. I examine one particularly powerful assertion made by those employing a national discourse of autochthony: the assertion that Migrants colonize National-Natives.

#### Territorial acknowledgements don’t solve and encourage “box ticking”.

---acknowledging land can’t resolve material violence but assuages white guilt and turns into perfunctory box checking which trades off with movements

Vowel, Native Studies MA, 16 (Chelsea Vowel, is Metis, has a Bed and LLB from the University of Alberta, MA in Native Studies, 9-23-16, Beyond Territorial Acknowledgments, <http://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/>, JKS)

In the first two quotes, it is clear that the intended purpose of territorial acknowledgments is recognition as a form of reconciliation. Kairos goes a bit deeper in the intention to also acknowledge the violent relationships between churches who ran residential schools, and Indigenous peoples, so what is being “recognized” is not merely Indigenous presence. Nonetheless it seems to me that when territorial acknowledgments first began, they were fairly powerful statements of presence, somewhat shocking, perhaps even unwelcome in settler spaces. They provoked discomfort and centered Indigenous priority on these lands. The third quote by Bob Joseph suggests that territorial acknowledgments can also be a way of honouring traditional Indigenous protocol. **I disagree that these acknowledgements can accomplish such a thing, as such statements of thanks to hosts barely even scratch the surface of such traditional protocols**. In fact, I think **it is dangerous to even suggest that territorial acknowledgments alone satisfy protocol in any way unless concrete actions accompany the words spoken**. I will return to this when I discuss moving beyond acknowledgments. Another purpose of territorial acknowledgements, related to emphasizing continuous Indigenous presence, is the way in which many spaces feel unsafe for Indigenous peoples. For example, at the University of McGill, asking for territorial acknowledgment was part of a wider attempt by student groups to “[create] a more welcoming environment for Indigenous students. The proposal called for McGill to publicly acknowledge on its website and in email signatures that McGill is built on traditionally Kanien’kehá:ka land.”[5] I personally experienced McGill as an incredibly alienating and invisibilizing environment, and that institution certainly has a lot of work to do in terms of acknowledging Indigenous presence (and Indigenous students) compared to other some universities. As a newer practice in such environments, territorial acknowledgments continue to have the power to disrupt and discomfit settler colonialism. It should also be emphasized that these territorial acknowledgments flow from the work of Indigenous peoples themselves, who are resisting invisibilization. When they are crafted, they are usually done so in consultation with local Indigenous peoples. However, it is also interesting to geographically track the criticisms of territorial acknowledgements, as a way of tracing their lineage. The strongest Indigenous critiques of these acknowledgments tend to come from the west coast, suggesting they have been happening there the longest, whereas in places like Montreal, territorial acknowledgments are still being introduced and are legitimately “cutting edge” in that political milieu. That’s not to say that strong Indigenous critique cannot exist absent of a tradition of territorial acknowledgments! We are almost certainly importing the practice into the United States, and it will not necessarily be welcomed there by Indigenous peoples for reasons unrelated to the rendering of such statements meaningless through repetition. I believe territorial acknowledgments can have numerous purposes, and in fact can be repurposed, so merely examining the stated intentions of these invocations is insufficient. What may start out as radical push-back against the denial of Indigenous priority and continued presence, may end up repurposed as “box-ticking” inclusion without commitment to any sort of real change. In fact, I believe this is the inevitable progression, a situation of familiarity breeding contempt (or at least apathy).

#### Honorable Harvest’s refusal to engage settler states sabotages successful indigenous movements. Binary between authentic resurgence and coopted recognition facilitates divide and conquer response.

---complete rejection of the state fractures indigenous movements because they use the state – the aff falls into a pessimism trap which trades off with active organizing

---example: the UN declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was groundbreaking because of the leadership roles that indigenous organizations took in creating it

Sheryl **LIGHTFOOT** Canada Research Chair of Global Indigenous Rights and Politics @ British Columbia – Anishinaabe from the Lake Superior Band of Ojibwe ’**20** in *Pessimism in International Relations* eds. Stevens and Michelsen p. 156-170

Despite all of these activities designed to re-write the relationship between states and Indigenous peoples, some high-profile critical Indigenous political theorists reject all state overtures towards reconciliation and take extremely pessimistic approaches towards future Indigenous-state relations. They advocate that Indigenous resurgence through a return to Indigenous land-based forms of governance is the only path to decolonisation. I argue that while resurgence school theorists are strong advocates for Indigenous nations, and bring focus and clarity to a set of issues about power structures and dynamics, they are all caught in the same set of three ‘pessimism traps’ that unnecessarily limit their capacity to contribute to improved Indigenous-state relationships. These pessimism traps emanate from a reliance on Fanonian revolutionary thought and a problematic application of Fanonian theory from French-colonised North Africa to an entirely different context in the English-speaking settler states. Finally, I argue, these pessimism traps are diametrically opposed to the work and vision of Indigenous organisations who have been working on the ground for decades to assert Indigenous nationhood both domestically and internationally, in ways that often assertively and creatively challenge and shift the existing system of sovereign states. In sum, because the resurgence school remains trapped in a pessimism box of its own making, it remains significantly out of step with Indigenous movements and actually risks harming their efforts to advance Indigenous self-determination in creative and innovative ways.

Pessimism Trap 1: A Clear Demarcation of Indigenous Individuals into Only Two Categories, 'Authentic5 and 'Co-Opted5

For Indigenous resurgence theorists, these two categories are the only possibilities, and there is no grey area in-between. In their view, Indigenous peoples are co-opted if they hold elected office, make land claims or economic development agreements with governments or industry, or even sign treaties. Furthermore, co-opted Indigenous peoples are so co-opted, that they do not even recognise how they are being used and colonised by the state and its private-sector partners. On the other hand, authentic Indigenous peoples live on their traditional lands, speak their Native languages, practice their culture and govern themselves in traditional fashion. They are the only ones that have successfully resisted the overwhelming forces of colonisation and its powers of co- optation, and the only ones with the power to do so into the future.

In his 2005 book, Wasdse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Preedom, Taiaiake Alfred calls on the original people, what he calls Onkwehonwe in the Mohawk language, to unify in resisting the colonial structures that continue to oppress them.5 Relying on warrior imagery in the Mohawk tradition, Alfred confronts Indigenous people to recognise Western domination in our communities and resist it. He argues forcefully that Indigenous peoples have become overly complacent on, and even dependent upon, Western social, economic and political structures. He calls for a resurgence in Indigenous spirituality and political structures in Indigenous communities. As he sees it, a strong Indigenous warrior is not one that necessarily engages in war and violent resistance but, rather, is one that shows real courage by living a daily life grounded in the spiritual teachings and practices of our ancestors. The decolonis- ing revolution he calls for is rooted within the peaceful resurgence of traditional spirituality and governance. As he writes, ‘There are people in all communities who understand that a true decolonization movement can emerge only when we shift our politics from articulating grievances to pursuing an organized and political battle for the cause of our freedom. These new warriors understand the need to refuse any further disconnection from their heritage and the need to reconnect with the spiritual bases of their existences’.6 While at first glance, this book represents a powerful and compelling call to action by Indigenous communities and leaders, a closer examination reveals all three pessimism traps in play throughout the text.

Alfred draws a sharp line between authentic Indigenous approaches and co-opted ones. As he puts it, ‘Not all of us have been conquered. There are still strong Onkwehonwe who persevere in their struggle for an authentic existence and who are capable of redefining, regenerating, and reimagining our collective existences’.7 Yet, he warns, The colonizers stand on guard for their ill-gotten privileges using highly advanced techniques, mainly co-optation, division and when required, physical repression’ and ‘with its massive resources, the state can co-opt leadership and movement successes’.8

Furthermore, Alfred notes, the authentic Indigenous peoples and leaders are no longer the majority, as the co-opted ones seem to occupy most of the leadership roles in organisations and communities. Lamenting the constant temptations for co-optation on offer, from land claims agreements, to casino capitalism, to chief and council salaries, Alfred writes, Working for a cause that has indigenous integrity means sacrifice. ...This is the reality of an authentic indigenous existence in political terms. And, evidently, in our communities today, there are only a few people who are convinced that taking on the psychological and financial burden of being really indigenous is worth the fight’.9

Similar patterns appear in Alfred’s follow-up 2009 book, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto.10 In this work, Alfred walks the reader through Indigenous values, weaving a thesis that a new kind of Indigenous leadership, characterised by the resurgence of Indigenous forms of self-determination, is the only way to resist colonialism and preserve what still exists of Indigenous culture and lifeways today. In a Fanonian spirit, he challenges Indigenous peoples, and particularly leaders, professionals and academics, to be aware of how colonialism has impacted them and their communities on every level, including and especially, psychologically. He challenges Indigenous leadership and communities to recognise these multiple layers of colonialism in current contemporary practice, and to resist them.

As in his earlier work, Alfred divides Indigenous peoples, communities and leadership into two stark categories: authentic and co-opted. Indigenous leaders, he says, either actively resist, or they co-operate with the state. When they co-operate with the state, they ‘rationalize and participate actively in their own subordination and the maintenance of the Other’s superiority’ and therefore become co-opted.11

Further, he sees that as states have moved away from overt violent control of Indigenous communities, co-option has become the preferred method of control and subordination:

The fact is that neither the state-sponsored modifications to the colonial-municipal model ...nor the corporate or public-government systems recendy negotiated in the North constitute indigenous governments at all. Potentially representing the final solution to the white society’s ‘Indian Problem,’ they use the co-operation of Native leaders in the design and implementation of such systems to legitimize the state’s longstanding assimilationist goals for indigenous nations and lands.12

One of the deepest problems, according to Alfred, is that co-opted communities, leaders and professionals do not often even realise that they are, in fact, co-opted. Co-option, he says, ‘is a subtle, insidious, undeniable fact, and it has resulted in a collective loss of ability to confront the daily injustices, both petty and profound, of Native life’.13 As a case in point, Alfred engages in a substantial discussion of how the concept of sovereignty itself is Western in focus and therefore, when Indigenous leaders advocate for it, on behalf of their nations and communities, they are unwittingly engaging in a politics of co-optation. ‘Shallow-minded politicians’, Alfred writes, ‘are unable to grasp that asserting a right to sovereignty has significant implications’. When they assert a claim to sovereignty but not to resist the state itself, ‘they are making a choice to accept the state as their model and to allow indigenous political goals to be framed and evaluated according to a “statist” pattern’.14

Another prominent member of the Indigenous resurgence school, Glen Coulthard (Yellowknives Dene), was mentored by Taiaiake Alfred and their common philosophy is immediately apparent. As Alfred writes in his foreword to Coulthard’s 2014 book, Red'Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Polities of Recognition, ‘Coulthard is talking about rising up, ...about resurgence and the politics of self-affirmation. This is a call to combat contemporary colonialism’s objectification and alienation and manipulation of our true selves’.15

Coulthard critiques the current Canadian policy atmosphere of reconciliation as contemporary colonialism, ultimately the same as the old colonialism, but with a new mask. He argues the structure of the settler colonial invasion continues to dispossess and oppress Indigenous peoples, as it always has, but it now has a new face: the disingenuous liberal politics of recognition—which includes such current policy initiatives as the delegation of self-determination, economic development and the settlement of land claims. He begins by noting that over the past forty years or so, there has been an ‘unprecedented degree of recognition for Aboriginal “cultural” rights within the legal and political framework of the Canadian state’.16 Coulthard acknowledges that the increase in recognition demands coming from Indigenous intellectual and community leaders are largely responsible for these changes to the structure of the Indigenous-state relationship in Canada. Yet, Coulthard’s goal in this work is to challenge the notion that ‘the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state can be adequately transformed via such a politics of recognition’.17 Rather than ushering in a new relationship, he argues, the ‘politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend’.18

In other words, all of the work and struggle by Indigenous leaders and advocates in the past four decades to advance self-government, recognition of Aboriginal rights and title and economic development for their communities has not only been futile, but damaging to what would or should have been an ‘authentic’ struggle for Indigenous self-determination. Further, all of these advocates and leaders do not even realise how co-opted they have become in the ongoing structures of colonialism. Citing Alfred, and echoing Fanon, Coulthard notes that the dominance of the recognition approach over an extended period of time has produced a class of ‘Aboriginal “citizens’” who have come to define themselves in terms of the colonial state and its institutions rather than the culture and political traditions of their own Indigenous nations. He identifies a similar process with capitalist economic development initiatives that have created an ‘emergent Aboriginal bourgeoisie whose thirst for profit has come to outweigh their ancestral obligations to the land and to others’.19 Unfortunately, Coulthard pessimistically views Indigenous rights advancement as ‘bleak’, since ‘so much of what Indigenous peoples have sought over the last forty years to secure their freedom has in practice cunningly assured its opposite’.20

In a 2007 article, Cherokee political scientist Jeff Corntassel takes the co-option argument to the international level.21 Corntassel acknowledges that UN fora do provide opportunities for strategising and diplomacy among Indigenous actors from diverse parts of the world, especially important in storytelling, information sharing and building solidarity. Corntassel also acknowledges that there ^Vere a handful of instances in the First UN Indigenous Decade (1995-2004) where Indigenous peoples were able to successfully challenge UN protocols and procedures and insert themselves into the UN ‘on their own terms’. However, despite these acknowledgements, Corntassel concludes that the UN system, being made up of states, aims to co-opt Indigenous peoples into the norms and mores of the state, thereby distracting them from their proper focus on advancing their own nationhood. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel falls into the first pessimism trap which demarcates Indigenous political leadership into ‘authentic’ and ‘co-opted’ categories.

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unified in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

In 2005’s Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, ‘I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart’.22 Referring to current state policies as a ‘self-termination movement’, Alfred states, ‘It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land’.23

Alfred’s Peace, Power; Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that ‘it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories’.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but ‘by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream’.25 According to Alfred, the state ‘relegates indigenous peoples’ rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy’.26

Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state’s desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. ‘Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice’, due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, ‘the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it’.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and ‘encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a “solution” that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie’.28

In a similar vein, Coulthard’s central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of ‘colonized subjects’, including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of ‘misrecog- nition’ granted through the state but can even come to identify with it 29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states first compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deem- phasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive

Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples.

Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35

Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future:

1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence;

2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches;

3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38;

4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and reflective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and

5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political configurations of power that we initially sought...to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-reflection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically non- exploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40

Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel finds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’ 43

Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’ 44

Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic 'Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities.

As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-im- agine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government.

This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-a-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46

#### Law can be an important site for challenging settler colonialism – treaty obligations prove.

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By exposing the political limitations of certain narrative strategies in enabling adequate redress for the past, Deloria further uses satire to open up space for considering new political obligations derived from indigenous treaty rights. In place of narrative frames that rely on affective states of exculpation and resignation, Deloria’s ironic counter-narrative produces a politics of postcolonial responsibility underpinned by satire’s systematic questioning of contemporary forms of solidarity and redress. As romance and tragedy each enacts a politics of closure in settler-colonial societies, we clarify the politics of postcolonial responsibility in counterpoint to the more openly action-oriented politics of possibility represented by comedy. Our understanding of the politics of postcolonial responsibility builds off Kevin Bruyneel’s reading of Deloria as asserting a politics of “postcolonial nationhood” that navigates a path between the civil rights movement and Third World decolonization movements. The objective of “postcolonial nationhood” is to “maintain a balance between making claims for specific rights and resources from the American government and asserting a strong collective claim for self-determination away from the American purview” (Bruyneel 2007, 148). The politics of postcolonial responsibility similarly strikes a balance between making claims on the collective responsibility of settler nationhood and promoting native self-determination and indigenous agency in pursuit of decolonization. Rejecting the comedic reliance on punctuated progress, given its affinities to the politics of inclusion, postcolonial responsibility affirms a more agonistic negotiation of three interrelated elements: the narrative telling of past colonial injuries, the ongoing status of colonial relations, and the politics of redress and solidarity.14

To assert claims to land restitution and the honoring of treaty rights, Deloria deliberately uses irony and satire to re-narrate the history of relations between Indian nations and the federal government. Deloria explicitly reads the treaties as ironic documents. As he contends, “In looking back at the centuries of broken treaties, it is clear that the United States never intended to keep any of its promises” (Deloria 1969, 48). Read in this light, treaties are ironic texts insofar as their symbolic language of land rights, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation is explicitly negated by the reality of a federal Indian policy committed to “cultural and economic imperialism” (Deloria 1969, 53). Importantly, he does not narrate this history as a tragic reversal of fortunes where the promise of equality and cooperation embodied in the treaties is violated by the inevitable thirst of settlers for land nor as a comic recovery in which indigenous peoples can be compensated through their eventual incorporation into the nationstate as equal citizens.

Directly refuting these tropes, Deloria writes, “There has not been a time since the founding of the republic when the motives of this country were innocent.” Urging his readers to reckon with “American history in its imperialistic light,” Deloria (1969, 51) argues that failures of progress are not signs of the limitations of moral character. Rather, they are markers of a constitutively colonial state in which democratic progress has been entangled with—even premised upon—colonial dispossession.15 Deloria deliberately narrates the violation of treaty rights not as a tragic reversal that violates the core commitments of the American nation to justice but as an ironic subversion of intent that ultimately exposes the structural logic of the settler state. Although they might acknowledge the past “sins” inflicted on native peoples by the settler state, romantic and tragic (as well as comedic) narrative frames do not connect this past to what Lorenzo Veracini (2015) calls “the settler colonial present.” Postcolonial responsibility entails a confrontation with the present–past of settler colonialism as a precedent for contemporary structures of settler-colonial rule. Present expressions of political responsibility, therefore, need to be oriented toward the ongoing structures of colonialism. In response to the violation of indigenous treaty rights, Deloria’s own political agenda seeks to enact an agonistic politics of postcolonial responsibility. Building from his narrative retelling of the United States as a constitutively colonial society, Deloria contrasts a politics of postcolonial responsibility as focused on transformative renewal to a politics of continued progress. For Deloria, reframing American history as a history of empire and colonialism is essential to the creation of a new ethic of political responsibility that might initiate the decolonization of American settler society. Deloria (1969, 53) writes, “Cultural and economic imperialism must be relinquished. A new sense of moral values must be inculcated into the American bloodstream.” Demanding from liberal settler societies a “cultural leave-us-alone agreement, in spirit and in fact,” Deloria nonetheless holds this selfdetermined agency in tension with indigenous peoples’ ongoing claims on the state. This “general policy of restitution for the past” would affirm “definite commitments to fulfill extant treaty obligations,” as well as land restitution and the recognition of nonrecognized tribes. In shedding light on the failure of American officials to live up to their incurred obligations to Native peoples, Deloria (1969, 13) writes, “The government has responsibility for the Indian estate because of treaty commitments and voluntary assumption of such responsibility.” Postcolonial responsibility thus importantly derives from treaty commitments that ironically bind the United States to the very nations it had sought to destroy.

#### “Decolonization” is too vague to be meaningful-structural claims of set col make it impossible.

---process of decol is context dependent and vague terms won’t work globally---numerous hurdles exist like private corporations, the state, which the aff can’t effectively challenge absent infiltration

Bashir and Busbridge, PhDs, 19

(Bashir, Sociology@OpenUniv., Rachel, ACUs National School of Arts , The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine Vol 67, Issue 2, 2019)

For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the widereaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of selfdetermination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best. Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (premodern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies. Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation, but in settler colonial contexts this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity. Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may

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#### Challenging monopolization good – extending the economic and political benefits of membership beyond existing classes best for struggle against settlerism.

Aziz **RANA** Law @ Cornell **AND** Nikhil Pal **SINGH** **’14** https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/08/the-legacies-of-settler-empire/

Thus, to universalize settler liberty — as I argue for in the book — would require a fundamental restructuring of American life. This is something radical critics themselves perceived at various moments in American history. It would mean thinking about how a democratic principle could actually govern all institutional sites and provide all communities with meaningful economic and political power.

Such an effort would transform, root and branch, settler legacies and living practices: from recognizing Indian sovereignty to fundamentally altering the structure of the economy to challenging the border as a closed barrier. The key thing to note is that such freedom, although emerging from a settler past, would no longer perpetuate settlerism.

This speaks to what I see as the dialectical character of freedom, where the conflict between an initial account of liberty and its opposition produces something new. And similarly, I would add that I do not believe that if we ever “universalized” settler freedom this would mean the end of subordination once and for all. Rather, in keeping with the dialectical vision, even successful projects of emancipation generate new legal and political orders that knit together secured liberties with emerging hierarchies.

In other words, the struggle for freedom is ongoing; it requires an aspiration to utopia but is never completely redeemed in history. This is to say that I don’t believe we can overcome the impasse of settler violence simply by rising above it or thinking differently — we are stuck with our particular histories and the modes of freedom and subordination that constitute our discursive frameworks and institutional practices. These histories open up the possibility of transformation — they give us tools to imagine utopias — but they can never be completely overcome.

This also underscores why my argument is not nostalgic, despite its discussion of the emancipatory dimensions of settler freedom. Those emancipatory elements were grounded in extreme violence. Indeed, one reason why I choose to refer to these arguments as “settler” — with all its fraught implications — rather than simply republican, populist, or socialist is to avoid extricating American economic radicalism from its colonial underpinnings.

This history of extreme violence means that there is no past we need to find a way back to; the settler experience offers no golden age before modern American imperialism. This acknowledgment perhaps distinguishes my views from those of critics like Christopher Lasch or even William Appleman Williams. If anything, for me, the two logics of empire — settler colonization and global police power — cannot be thought of as distinct historical periods. They are deeply interlinked and fold into one another rather than marking clear breaks or ruptures in time.

Why does this discussion of settler freedom as integral to US conceptions of sovereignty and governance matter for something called the Left today?

I think it’s essential for at least two reasons.

First, a remarkable feature of US domestic conversations about capitalism and economic inequality is the extent to which they are often separated from conversations about the application of US power abroad. As just one example, take the issue of immigration and immigrant rights, a focal point of new labor organizing on the one hand and conservative reaction on the other.

The overwhelming tendency is to present immigration as an issue that begins at the national border, with virtually no attention paid to the particular histories, international economic pressures, and specific US foreign policy practices that generate migration patterns in the first place. The movement of men and women from their homes does not occur in a vacuum and is deeply tied to patterns of colonization and empire that stitch together the Global North and the Global South, as well as to the recent security politics of the US and Europe across the post-colonial world.

On the Left, it’s obviously taken as a truism that capitalism is a global system requiring global political action. But without articulating the mutually constitutive relationship between capitalism and the ongoing politics of empire, it’s very hard to perceive the truly global dimension of economic inequality. Moreover, the separation between what’s viewed as “domestic” and what’s viewed as “foreign” means that it’s equally difficult to recognize and develop solidarities between communities in the North and in the South or to appreciate how seemingly US-centered struggles may be only one piece of a broader global reality.

A key effect is the decline of a self-conscious and committed internationalist sensibility among economic reformers in the US. Thinking of inequality in isolation from colonialism or from exercises of American hegemony essentially leaves uncontested the security ends of the US state, ends that feed back in direct and indirect ways precisely into sustaining corporate power and class hierarchies at home.

It should be noted that during the heyday of the labor movement or of black radicalism, activists very clearly articulated an independent foreign policy grounded above all in the interests of oppressed communities — one that emphasized solidarities abroad (between workers or colonized peoples) and that directly challenged the security state itself. Nothing like this exists at present, and I can’t help but think that one reason is the discursive disconnect between questions of economy on the one hand and those of race, empire, and hegemony on the other.

The second reason for bringing the legacies of settler empire back into our discussions of capitalism has to do with specifically American roadblocks to social democracy. Thomas Piketty notes that the United States in the nineteenth century was marked by far greater white economic equality than European counterparts. But he spends less time on the essentially colonial explanation for this fact.

Throughout American history, the tension between capitalism and both democratic self-government and economic independence has largely been resolved through native expropriation and/or racialized economic subordination. And many of the great American struggles to replace capitalism with a more humane political economy have foundered precisely on questions of membership.

For example, radicals during Reconstruction, the Populist movement, the New Deal, and the long black freedom struggle all emphasized the need to pursue policies that made economic justice both universal and effective. Yet all faced powerful counterforces that defined membership narrowly and reverted to colonial dichotomies of insiders and outsiders, in the process breaking class solidarities and preserving racial and economic privileges. To return to immigration, today we can see this dynamic playing out once more in the context of debates around the legal rights and status of undocumented workers.

To make matters worse, a common American narrative has been to blame oppressed communities for the collapse of “universal” economic agendas. The conventional story of the 1960s instructs us that it is black radicals at the close of the decade that were not universalistic enough — despite the fact that they maintained a persistent and thoroughgoing critique of capitalism — and thus scared away potential white allies, fatally compromising left-liberal change. This blame narrative suggests just how pernicious race in particular and colonial legacies more generally have been for fulfilling social democratic goals.

The politics of exclusion has been a persistent means of cleaving class solidarities and undermining direct confrontation with the prevailing economic order. The collapse of these solidarities has then been blamed on the very radicals — particularly within excluded communities — that were at the forefront of pressing for universal and revolutionary reform in the first place.

The only way that these cycles of retrenchment and blame can be broken in the United States is by fully integrating our conversations about class and race, capitalism and colonialism.

#### Structural theories collapse from internal contradictions, attempts to remedy produce a *degenerative research program.*

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According to Veracini, if ‘there is a plot in the “historiography of elimination” and more generally in settler-colonial studies it is that while the structure attempts to eliminate Indigenous peoples it fails to do so’, or in other words, ‘the structure cannot be reduced to its intention’.33 That is to say, Wolfe’s logic of elimination should not be equated with elimination itself. As Veracini explains: Far from equating settler colonialism with elimination, Wolfe’s ‘structure’ refers to a continuing relationship of inequality between Indigenous and settler collectives. Beside ‘structure’ and ‘event’, it seems important to note that Wolfe refers to a logic of elimination, not to elimination itself. After all, were Indigenous elimination to become an accomplished and irretrievable fact, settler colonialism would lose its logic.34 While the key for Wolfe is to shed light on the mechanisms of elimination, Veracini opens the door to research into what the structure actualising the logic fails to accomplish. Intent after all, speaks of a dynamic of success and failure. Logically as well as empirically, if structures fail to accomplish their objectives, thus the notion of the structure needs to be thought as a formation traversed by disagreeing forces impairing its missions, alongside an assessment of the degree of consistency this formation has achieved. It is wrong then to assume that the forces responsible for the formation of the settler structure are to be sought in a uniform, unidirectional and one-sided series of power strategies conceived as always already signifying domination. In other words, settler inscription and determinations do not operate in free-floating spaces; thus it makes little sense to analyse them in isolation from the oppositional forces that in their action ignore, slow down, impede or distract settler progress. Therefore, we suggest defining the structure of invasion in terms of the variances between changing compositions of forces, those seeking to eliminate Indigenous life and the forces causing some of these attempts to fail, hence compelling the settler colonial regime to address what escapes it and rework itself.35 Historically, these dialectics lead to incompleteness, but incompleteness is how dialectical contents are transcended. The reproductive aspiration of any structure is dependent on its capabilities to properly manage escapes. While structuralism would favour the comprehension of what binds the structure, a post-structuralist analysis cannot do without adopting the same introspection but from the viewpoint of what escapes it. Therefore, the significant questions for us concern how an emergent formation internalises adverse rationalities to make them its own limits, where and how a structure is forced to bifurcate, where old determinacies lose their consistency and endurance such that they have to be replaced or changed, and most importantly for our case study, how this knowledge assists the decomposition of the structure. It is a mistake then to invoke the term structure to imply a perfectly structured thing or ‘the earth’s last word’.36 Veracini captured this dynamism of the settler colonial situation by describing it in terms of a ‘permanent movement’.37 It is time to call a spade a spade: resistance is the general name for the forces challenging the settler forces of elimination. Elimination and resistance shape each other; each responds to the other. Both become defined in an ever-changing dialectical relation, where dialectics are motioned, pushed towards new directions, by overflows. At any point in time, the vicissitudes of elimination are the vicissitudes of the struggle over the formation of the settler society or, as Veracini recently put it: the ‘settler colonial present is also an indigenous one’. Therefore, unless we ascribe to the academic obsession with the agents of oppression as omnipresent so popular these days, the incompleteness of elimination cannot be explained just in terms of the oppressor’s self-error or strategic deferment. It is the empirical interaction between opposite forces that create incompleteness. Tracing the paths and operations of the myriad of social forces that in the first instance bring settlers to plan, invent, react and rethink their practices of appropriation appears as methodologically necess

ary. Or to phrase the same thing from the other end, it makes no sense to evaluate the forces of life without accounting for those seeking to destroy it. In sum, it is imperative to account for the struggle that have made settler destruction an incomplete project. As Macoun and Strakosch note, ‘Exposing the settler colonial project as fundamentally incomplete – and unable to be completed in the face of Indigenous resistance – has the potential to be a profoundly liberating and destabilizing move’.39 Incompleteness is the symptom of resistance. Put otherwise, to eradicate incompleteness and resistance from the analysis of the systematicity of the emerging settler structure is in more ways than one to force an account that erases the native one more time, this time permanently. In such retrospective accounts, Althusser claimed, ‘Everything is accomplished in advance; the structure precedes its elements and reproduces them in order to reproduce the structure’.40 Where native resistance is excluded from the analysis of native elimination, as Rana Barakat has recently explained, The hegemonic presence of the settler on the land is mirrored as a hegemony embedded within the primary placement of the settler in scholarly literature. Like the attempted erasure of the indigenous presence on the land, this settler dominated framework in the scholarship is the attempted devaluation and eventual erasure of the Native history of and presence on the land.41 Much has been written on Patrick Wolfe’s rejection of resistance as a category of analysis in settler colonial theory. In the very last page of Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Wolfe writes: ‘What needs to be written in is not the agency of the colonised but the total context of inscription’;42 that is, the Wolfean paradigm opted to funnel research to study ‘the settler-colonial will, a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion’.43 In such a view, two separate lines of inquiry are presented: the study of settler colonial domination and the study of Indigenous discourse and resistance – the second being ‘peripheral’ as Wolfe states – to the analysis of the first.44 As Wolfe adds, It is important to keep the two perspectives separate. As stated, my purpose is to categorize colonizing strategies employed in Australia. It is not to categorize Indigenous strategies of resistance, survival or anything else. The failure to distinguish between the two perspectives recapitulates assimilationism. 45 To properly understand Wolfe’s methodological strategy, we should take seriously his use of the first-person singular as his subjective coordinates in the settler project. Wolfe is proposing a research agenda that counters the historical complicity of white settler academics in the making and maintenance of (Indigenous) elimination. In this reading, by engaging in acts of representation of Indigenous discourses and experiences (resistance included), white academics reproduce settler invasion: Nothing can escape being turned into a text for the analyst to appropriate, interrogate and reconstruct. [. . .] The outcome is an ethnographic ventriloquism whereby invaded subjects are made to speak unawares, in contexts in which they could reasonably believe they were doing something else.46 Wolfe’s methodological preference rightly rests on undeniable historical grounds: in settler societies there can be no innocent academic discourses about Indigenous knowledge and experiences.47 For all its historical complicity, the white settler academy is always already suspicious, since, as, for instance, in the Australian case, ‘the significance of anthropology is that it has provided – though not exclusively – narratives that have been selected in furtherance of the logic of elimination’.48 As Wolfe explains: Claims to authority over indigenous discourse made from within the settlercolonial academy necessarily participate in the continuing usurpation of indigenous space (invasion is a structure not an event). This theoretical conclusion is abundantly borne out by the Australian academy’s deep involvement in successive modalities of settler-colonial discourse. Whether by accident or design, whether by measuring, quantifying, pathologizing, expunging or essentializing, a comprehensive range of authorities – anthropologists in particular, but also historians, biologists, archaeologists, psychologists, criminologists, the whole Foucauldian line-up – have produced an incessant flow of knowledge about Aborigines that has become available for selective appropriation to warrant, to rationalize and to authenticate official definitions, policies and programmes for dealing with ‘the Aboriginal problem’.49 Similarly, reflecting on the role of Israeli historians in the production of knowledge justifying the Zionist settler colonial project, Ilan Pappé similarly commented: Rather than setting out to validate grand claims such as a persistent, age-old Jewish urge to settle in Palestine or the emptiness of Palestine prior to the arrival of the Zionists, they sliced up these claims by time frame or topic and provided limited empirical evidence for their validity. Thus they would look at Jewish urges for Palestine during a particular decade or discuss conditions in Palestine during a particular year or season. But whether they reconstructed the historical process as a whole, or focused on a single anecdotal chapter within it, they remained loyal both to Zionism and to scientific truth, as they saw it.50 Undoubtedly, the question of positionality justly troubles choices and roles in the study of settler colonialism. But it is not only, as Merlan pointed out, that Wolfe escalated the ban on ‘speaking for’ into one of ‘speaking about’ Indigenous people and resistance; it is just that it makes no sense to write in the settler context of inscription, to use Wolfe’s words, and pretend that Indigenous knowledge, perceptions and experiences are not affected.51 However, as a trace of history, as Wolfe conceived it in his last book, race unavoidably infiltrates and shapes contemporary critical engagements with colonialism, and as a corollary, Wolfe proposed a form of research collaboration or division, where Indigenous scholarship emerges as the sole legitimate source of knowledge of Indigenous strategies of resistance and survival, while white academics are left with one and only one untainted avenue of research to follow; that is, engaging in critical white auto-ethnographies.52 Just recently, Barakat suggested a disciplinary division of this sort, but in distinction to Wolfe who denounced settler’s representations/appropriations of the native in academic work, Barakat criticises the settler colonial paradigm for ignoring the native in so doing giving the whole focus to settlers’ adventures. So Barakat asks, ‘How can a settler colonial studies analysis contribute to an Indigenous analysis while not becoming the central focus of the narrative?’53 Though it preserves the racial division of labour, Barakat’s answer is interesting and worth considering: ‘Scholars can use settler colonialism as a useful method of analysis within the larger project of Indigenous studies’.54 One way or another, the division of academic labour runs the risk of echoing – rather than combatting – the segregative effects of the empirical divisions that exist. It also takes us directly into the dimensions of the anticolonial struggle, and forces us to ask who is entitled to participate in the struggle, under what conditions and in which actions. Wolfe’s division of academic labour is not the answer we embrace. As Macoun and Strakosch observed, settler colonial studies ‘explains more of who we are than previous approaches, but it is not coincident with all that we are, and is not able to explain the entire encounter between Indigenous and settler peoples’.55 In addition, as Behar states for Mizrahi literature, ‘while ethnic, gender, or racial origins of authors are undeniably indispensable for making full sense of literary development generally . . . they should be considered of secondary ontological status vis-à-vis the content of texts’.56 That is, in transcending the given, subjectivity is not trumped by positionality. Wolfe’s early position on the issue of resistance, we suspect, encompassed more preoccupations than how to respond to the white appropriation of Indigenous discourses and experiences. According to Wolfe, ‘Indigenous resistance has been a constant feature of the entire settler-colonial era’, and therefore, ‘in generating its own resistance, settler-colonial power also contains it’.57 For Wolfe, in responding to the constraints of power, resistance is always quickly reappropriated. But in adopting this conception, we risk conceiving no outside to settler colonial power. Thus, oppression and domination in all their forms and shapes are given explanatory monopoly thus replicating their omnipresence in the shaping and managing of life. (13-18)

#### Turning official archives against themselves is a tactic of decolonization – genealogy traces official silences to restrict authority.

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Jacques Derrida’s account of the Freudian ‘death drive’ inherent to the archive has particular pertinence for the state archives of settler-colonial nations, where genocidal fantasies fuse with the inherently repressive thrust of colonial rule. The genocidal effects of settler colonialism don’t result only from mass death but also from governmental methods that recast Indigenous peoples as subject to, or amalgamated within, the body of a settler nation.45 Derrida suggested the shutting down and immobilising the past by containing it in an archive, where documents lie under the ‘in-finite’ threat of their destruction.46 The vulnerability of Indigenous records to extinction has been highlighted by Lauren Marsh and Stephen Kinnane in their discussion of the 'ghost files’ in the Western Australian Aboriginal affairs records. By this they meant registers and index records that refer to files that had been destroyed.47 The archives then are ‘haunted’ by the traces of now absent material that might have provided answers or clues to the search for evidence of the Indigenous experience, or indeed the very presence of Indigenous people.48 Comparing what has happened to records of Aboriginal administration to the more recent destructions of secret police files in East Berlin, Marsh and Kinnane argue that the records of Indigenous peoples should be regarded as ‘archives of a repressive regime’ and managed accordingly.49 In this case, ‘unsettling’ the archive by animating the ghosts within it becomes critically important for efforts to **decolonize the archive**.

Such a project must necessarily be carried out in direct resistance to the logic of the archives themselves. As Bill Russell pointed out for the records of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) in Canada, those officials who collated, compiled and gathered the information documenting the activities of Indigenous administration were aware of the historical significance of the records. Their impulse was to preserve, in the words of one such custodian, ‘the remembrance of what these men [DIA officers and missionaries] have done for its wards ... as an example to future generations.’50 To challenge the complacency of such archives requires the kind of ethnographic approach that Stoler advocated, reading ‘along the grain’ of the archive to highlight ‘its consistencies of misinformation, omission, and mistake,’51 rather than reinforcing its self-representation as the locus of power and authority, by seeking to extract information from it. Such an approach might constitute an effort to ‘decolonise’ the official archive of settler-colonial nation-states, in tandem with projects to authorise the alternative and marginalised archives created by Indigenous people in an ongoing response to state oppression.52 Alternatively, **the archive of the state might be turned against itself**. In recent times in settler colonial nations, the nation-state has been called to account for past policies against Indigenous people, in order to enable redemptive actions, including official apologies and forms of compensation, by the state, on behalf of the broader non-lndigcnous community. Exactly what relationship exists between the nation-state and the non-lndigcnous public community is not particularly clear, although the assumption is that in a democratic society, there is a direct connection between the policies of elected governments and the people who elected them. The process entails a historiography that interrogates the actions of government as documented in the official archive. It tends to result in a public debate between defenders of past government policies and those who would indict them, both sides often arguing their position on the basis of the archival record. Legal issues around Indigenous rights and entitlements also tend to entail research in archival records, and arc also fiercely contested.55 The assumption that such archives can offer a reflection of actual events in any comprehensiveness, however, has been problematic because of the very nature of the archive, including the deliberate destruction of unedifying records by the state. Verne Harris, who worked with the archives of the apartheid state in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has coined the term ‘the archival sliver’ to suggest the limitations and chimerical nature of the archive.54 And Michel-Rolph Trouil-lot, a historian of the French Caribbean reminds us, the presences and absences in the archive arc ‘neither neutral or natural,’ but are created; that ‘silencing’ is an archival practice.55